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Developments in the area of human rights continue to figure prominently
in the evolving jurisprudence of the European Union. The Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms has assumed an increasingly important role
in the opinions of the Advocates General' and in decisions of the Court of First
Instance and most recently, it was cited by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
for the first time.2 In another development, the Court of First Instance has ruled
that UN Security Council resolutions trump fundamental human rights
guarantees. Finally, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
deferred to an opinion of the European Court of Justice concerning an
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms despite the fact that it might have decided the case differently.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, although not legally
binding, is advancing, albeit in some sense covertly through citations in the
opinions of the Advocates General and the courts of the European Union. In
addition, the Parliament and the Commission continue to cite the Charter as
inspiration for many of its actions.
When the EU was first established in 1957, its primary goal was the
attainment of economic integration.4 Although the Treaty of Rome contains a
social chapter that gives limited mention to human rights, its primary focus was
to improve working conditions on a harmonized basis throughout the European
community. It was not viewed as a guarantor of rights.
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As originally envisaged, human rights were to be protected by the
individual Member States through their national constitutions and laws, and
through the Strasbourg Process. However, when the ECJ announced the
doctrine of supremacy of community law over national legislation in 1964, the
doctrine was resisted by some states that had strong human rights provisions in
their national constitutions. In response, the ECJ as early as 1969, held that
fundamental rights were enshrined in the general principles of Community law.'
In the early 1970s the Court noted that the EU would be guided by
constitutional traditions of the Member States and by the provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.'
In recent years the ECJ has effectively incorporated the decisions of the
ECHR into its human rights jurisprudence. The Court now cites almost
routinely the case law of the Strasbourg Court. This is indeed striking since
citation by the ECJ to the case law of another court is unusual.7 However, the
Court has also ruled that the EU itself could not accede to the Convention.
In July of 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms was proclaimed at
the Nice Summit. However, even though the document has political force, it
is not legally binding on Member States. The Charter was included as Part II
of the ill-fated Constitution and its importance continues to grow together with
a movement to adopt the Charter as a separate document
The Charter not only explicitly reaffirms the rights set out in the European
Convention but covers a range of rights not included in the Convention such as
the right to good administration and social rights of workers.9 It is composed
of a preamble and chapters pertaining to Dignity, Freedom, Equality, Solidarity,
Citizens' Rights, and Justice and incorporates fifty paragraphs enumerating
extensive rights."°
5. Case C-29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
6. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 17 (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int; Defeis, supra note 4, at 371-72.
7. Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Justice: The Impact of European Union accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 291,291-292 (IngolfPemice, Juliane Kokott, & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006).
8. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 41.
9. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, arts. U-87, 11-101, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 47-50.
10. See generally Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 3 10)
1. These include a right to life (with the death penalty proscribed), a right to respect for one's physical and
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Although a few countries (including France, Germany, Denmark, and
Sweden) have accepted the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the document is not
without controversy.1 The U.K. ultimately accepted incorporation of the
Charter into the draft Constitution with the provision that it should apply to
"[m]ember States only when they are implementing Union law."' 2 Further, the
draft Constitution provided that the Charter is to be interpreted consistently
with constitutional provisions of Member States.13
The Charter has already played an important role in the European human
rights arena despite the uncertainty about its legal force. This influence can be
found in numerous opinions by Advocates General and judgments by the Court
of First Instance. In most cases the Charter of Fundamental Rights is cited
alongside the European Convention of Human Rights. Typically, citation to the
Charter is followed by the disclaimer that the "Charter's legal status is still
uncertain, but its importance should not be ignored."' 4
For example, in a case involving right of access to documents, Advocate
General Ldger stated that the Charter should not be regarded as "a mere list of
purely moral principles without any consequences."' 5 He noted that since the
rights in the Charter are drawn from values unanimously held by Member States
and consolidated by the Member States, they form the top level of protection
of community values. Further, the sources listed in the Charter's preamble
contain binding legal force, which allows the Community to benefit from values
that are so highly and commonly held. Lfger noted that the Charter was meant
to be an instrument for classifying fundamental rights and it is a "source of
guidance as to the true nature of the Community rules of positive law."' 6
The Court of First Instance similarly frequently cites the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. For example, in a case involving the presumption of
innocence the Court cited the Charter along with the ECHR for the principle
that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right. The Court stated, "it
is necessary to take account of the principle of the presumption of innocence
resulting in particular from Article 6(2) of the ECHR, and by Article 47 of the
leave.
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that are protected in the
Community legal order."' 7 Thus, the Charter is placed in the same category as
other legally binding instruments as part of the Community legal order.'8
However, the Court also notes that the Charter does not have legally binding
force.
While the Charter is cited frequently in the Opinions of the Advocates
General and the Court of First Instance, until recently, the European Court of
Justice has avoided mentioning the Charter at all. However, in June 2006, in
European Parliament v. Council ofthe European Union the Court reversed this
trend in the case involving a Directive on family reunification that was
challenged by the Parliament. 9 As is customary with such directives, the
Directive cited the Charter in recognizing the right to family reunification and
no discrimination based on age.20 In an Opinion, Advocate General Kokott
writes, "[w]hile the Charter still does not produce binding legal effects
comparable to primary law, it does, as a material legal source, shed light on the
fundamental rights protected by Community legal order."'"
The European Court of Justice in its opinion noted that the Preamble of the
Directive refers to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.22 In
discussing the relevance of the Charter, the Court acknowledged that while the
Charter is not a legally binding instrument its importance was recognized by the
Community legislature by placing it in the Directive.23 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the "principle aim of the Charter ... is to reaffirm rights as they
result.. . from Constitutional traditions and international obligations common
to Member States, the Treaty on the European Union ... and the European
Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms."24
The Charter was solemnly proclaimed by the Parliament, the Council
and the Commission in Nice on December 7, 2000. While the
Charter is not a legally binding instrument, the Community legislature
did however, acknowledge its importance by stating, in the second
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2001) (opinion of Advocate General lger). In other instances involving issues of criminal procedure such
as the right to an effective remedy and protection from double jeopardy, the Charter is cited alongside of the
Convention.
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EUR-Lex (June 27, 2006).
20. Id. 32.
21. Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006 EUR-Lex (Setp.
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recital in the preamble to the Directive, that the Directive observes the
principles recognized not only by Article 8 of the ECHR but also in
the Charter. Furthermore, the principal aim of the Charter, as is
apparent from its preamble, is to reaffirm rights as they result, in
particular, from the constitutional traditions and international
obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European
Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters
adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the
case-law of the Court ... and of the European Court of Human
Rights. 25
In its findings the Court discusses the relevant provisions of the Charter
pertaining to respect for private or family life.
While incorporation of the Charter has been widely noted and
enthusiastically received, it has also been subject to criticism. Just ten days
before the Court issued its opinion citing the ECJ, the well respected Advocate
General Sir Francis Jacobs discussed the Charter. He noted that the Charter has
no legal force and, that although several Advocates General and the Court of
First Instance had referred to the Charter as a non-binding authority on human
rights, it had not been relied on by the ECJ as a legal source. Although he
acknowledged that in many respects it was preferable that the EU has its own
human rights law appropriate to its own competence and nature, he criticized
the Charter as confusing and misleading.26
Despite the misgivings of Sir Francis Jacobs, it seems clear that the
Charter has taken on an increasingly important role in the human rights
jurisprudence of the European Union and that the movement for accession is
gaining momentum.2
Two cases involving Human Rights decided in this past year, one by the
ECJ and the other by the ECHR, will likely have a profound impact on human
rights and the EU.
In a stunning decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in September
2005 in Yusuf v. Council of the European Union and the Commission of the
European Communities, the Court affirmed the supremacy of Security Council
Resolutions over obligations under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and, indeed, over the treaty
obligations of Member States.28
25. Id.
26. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 293. Jacobs was critical also of the position that the EU should accede
to the European Convention. EU accession to the ECHR is intended is to fill a gap, by allowing an individual
to bring a case against the EU, as well as Member States. Thus, he suggests that extending the jurisdiction
of the ECJ is preferable to EU accession to the ECHR and notes that the ECJ should be given a wider role
to ensure respect for the rule of law in important areas that require effective judicial review.
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The case involved Ahmed Ali Yusuf, a Swede of Arab origin, who had
been placed on a list of alleged terrorists by the U.N. Sanctions Committee.29
The Security Council Resolution required that all funds and other financial
resources controlled directly or indirectly by individuals associated with the
Taliban, Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network be frozen.3" It also
published a list of alleged terrorists.3 In order to implement the sanctions
regime, the European Council enacted regulations that in effect froze the assets
of Yusuf. Yusuf claimed that the sanctions were in violation of the Treaty of
Rome, which provides for disciplinary actions against states not single
individuals.32 He also claimed that his fundamental rights, including his right
to make use of his property, right to a fair hearing and right to an effective
judicial remedy were violated.3
The Court of First Instance held that the EC Treaty empowers the Council
to impose economic and financial sanctions on third countries, when a common
position adopted by the European Union under the common foreign and
security policy so provide.34 The Council had in the past taken restrictive
measures against persons who constructively governed a part of a country and
against persons or entities associated with them or provided financial support.35
Indeed this type of smart sanction is aimed at individuals and is designed to
reduce suffering of civilians and has been utilized by the Security Council since
the 1990s.36 It then ruled that the Council is competent also, under similar
conditions, to impose economic and financial sanctions such as the freezing of
funds on individuals, in connection with the fight against international
terrorism.37
The Court then turned to the interplay between rights guaranteed by the
European Convention and possible conflict with Security Council resolution.3"
The Court noted that under § 103 of the United Nations Charter, the obligations
of the Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United
Nations prevail over any other obligation, including the obligations under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and under the EC Treaty. The Court stated: "[f]rom the standpoint
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of international law, the obligations of the Member States of the United Nations
under the Charter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every other
obligation of domestic law or of international treaty law including, for those of
them that are members of the Council of Europe, their obligations under the
ECHR and, for those that are also members of the Community, their obligations
under the EC Treaty."39 This paramountcy extends to decisions of the Security
Council.
The Court further noted that although the European Union itself is not a
member of the United Nations, the Community is bound by the obligations
flowing from the Charter of the United Nations, in the same way as are its
Member States.40 First, the Community may not infringe the obligations
imposed on its Member States by virtue of the UN Charter or impede their
performance. 4 Second, the Community is required to adopt all the provisions
necessary to allow its Member States to fulfill those obligations.42
The Court observed that the Community regulations were enacted to put
into effect at the Community level decisions of the Security Council. 43 Any
review of the internal lawfulness of the regulation would therefore involve the
Court in examining, indirectly, the lawfulness of the decisions in question."
The Court stated, "[i]t must therefore be considered that the resolutions of the
Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court's
judicial review and that the Court has no authority to call in question, even
indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community law. On the contrary, the
Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in a manner
compatible with the obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the
United Nations. 45
Nevertheless, the Court did reserve for itself one area of review of Security
Council decisions. The Court would examine the contested regulation and,
indirectly, the Security Council resolutions in the light of the higher rules of
general international law falling within the scope ofjus cogens-a peremptory
norm of public international law from which neither the Member States nor the
bodies of the United Nations may derogate.46 It then considered claimed
violations of human rights including deprivation of property, right of personal
defense and right of effective judicial review in light of rules ofjus cogens and
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Several other cases involving the contested regulations were subsequently
decided by the Court of First Instance. The Court, using reasoning similar to
the Yusufcase upheld the Council regulations. Appeals to the European Court
of Justice are pending and it will be interesting to see whether the Court adopts
the reasoning or limits it.
The final Case to be discussed is a judgment not of the ECJ but of the
ECHR. The Case is Bosphorus v. Ireland which involved the impoundment of
an airplane pursuant to EC regulations that were enacted to implement the
Sanctions regime of the Security Council with respect to the former
Yugoslavia.4"
Previously, the Regulation had been challenged49 and through an Article
177 referral by Ireland to the ECJ, the ECJ determined that the Regulations
applied and that the impoundment did not violate fundamental human rights
including the right to quiet enjoyment of property as set forth in the
Convention.5"
When the impoundment was challenged in the ECHR as violating Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention, the ECHR very carefully surveyed the human rights
system for protection of human rights in the European Union and reviewed both
the opinion of the AG and the decision of the Court itself.5" It found that system
to be equivalent to the Convention system both substantively and
procedurally.52 By equivalent protection, the Court stated that it means
comparable rather than identical system of protection.53 The Court noted that
any requirement that the organizations system of protection be identical could
run counter to the interests of international cooperation 54 -an interest which it
described as a legitimate interest of considerable weight.55 Although not
identical to the Convention, the EU protections were comparable or equivalent
to the Convention system and the Court, in effect deferred to the decision of the
ECJ without further scrutiny.56
Clearly, human rights protection within the EU continues to evolve.
However, with a dual system for human rights protection, difficult questions
and challenges will remain both for the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights.
48. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 3-4 (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
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